"Suddenly Married: Joint Taxation and the Labor Supply of Same-Sex Married Couples After U.S. v. Windsor" (PDF)
A joint taxation system can exacerbate the deadweight loss of taxation due to labor supply responses, but evidence is scarce. I provide direct evidence of the efficiency costs and labor supply effects of joint taxation in the United States by leveraging tax variation created by federal same-sex marriage recognition following the 2013 United States v. Windsor Supreme Court ruling. I find moderate hours responses to taxation among predicted primary earners and larger labor force participation responses among predicted secondary earners. I also show that joint taxation is less efficient and generates less tax revenue compared to individual taxation. My findings suggest that there are efficiency gains to lowering tax rates for secondary earners, but whether greater efficiency is worth the lower associated tax equity across families remains an open question.
JEL: D10, H21, H24, J22
"Marriage, Divorce, and Tax and Transfer Policy" (PDF)
I use variation from the 1990s in the Earned Income Tax Credit and welfare reform to estimate the effects on marrying and divorcing. I examine flows into and out of marriage, use test scores to predict who is most likely to be affected by the policy changes, and employ a flexible functional form to estimate heterogeneous effects. I find that low-earning single parents are more likely to marry due to the EITC expansion and lower welfare generosity, while mid-earning married parents are less likely to divorce and high-earning married parents are more likely to divorce due to the EITC expansion.
Works in progress
"Marriage Market Returns to College Selectivity" with Suqin Ge and Amalia Miller
"Bargaining Power in Married Couples: Evidence from U.S. v. Windsor"